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While modal subordination has been much discussed since its first description and
analysis (Roberts, 1989), one aspect that has not yet been described is the fact that modals
can be divided into two classes: those that undergo modal subordination obligatorily,
and those that do so optionally. Consider data first noticed by Binnick (1971): The
situation is that there is a bomb which the addressee is walking towards; the bomb may
be a time bomb, in which case the addressee should flee, or it may be a landmine, in
which case the addressee should simply stay away.
(1) a. Don’t go near that bomb. It’ll explode. (landmine)
b. Don’t go near that bomb. It’s gonna explode. (time-bomb or landmine)
While Binnick noticed that (1-a) has a conditional reading, (If you go near the bomb, it will
explode) and (1-b) has a predictive reading (The bomb is going to explode regardless), (1-b)
can also have a conditional reading as in (1-a). The crucial contrast, then, is whether
there is an obligatory implicit conditional meaning, or and optional one.
Roberts (1989) analyzes implicit conditional readings (modal subordination, hence-
forth MS) in (1) as cases of contextual domain restriction, but there has been no dis-
cussion of whether MS is optional or obligatory. I argue that while the modal base of
every modal is contextually determined (Kratzer, 1977), giving rise to MS (Frank, 1997),
some modals, like will have a familiarity presupposition (Heim, 1982) on their modal
base, giving rise to obligatory MS, while others like gonna have no such presupposition,
giving rise to optional MS. This is a general property of modals, not just will and gonna,
meaning there are two classes of modals, as shown below.
(2) Don’t go near that bomb...
a. It {would, could, will} explode. (landmine)
b. It {might, may, is gonna} explode. (time-bomb or landmine)
Establishing Modality It first must be established that will and gonna are modals.
Roberts, in her original analysis, assumes will to be a tense and suggests that some other
strategy besides domain restriction is available for implicit conditional readings on bare
tenses. However, as argued in Klecha (2010) this cannot be: observe that while MS is
available in modals as seen in (2), it is never available in tenses:
(3) a. If Martina went to New York, she bought lots. # She had fun.
b. If it’s four in the morning, Julia is awake. #She’s making breakfast.
The second sentence in both (3-a) and (3-b) lack a conditional meaning. If there were a
strategy for giving implicit conditional readings to bare tenses we should expect them to
appear in (3). If will and gonna were tenses, we would expect them to behave like other
tenses. Neither of these things hold. For more arguments for modal analyses of futures,
see Klecha (2010), Condoravdi (2003), and Copley (2002).
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It is often argued in the literature on modal subordination (for a recent example see
Asher & McCready, 2007) that will is not a modal, supposedly explaining its apparent
inability to undergo MS, suggested by the following data:
(4) a. A wolfi might come in here. Iti would eat you first.
b. A wolfi might come in here. #Iti’ll eat you first.
However, the infelicity of (4-b) cannot be explained as due to will’s general inability
to undergo modal subordination; clearly (1) demonstrates that will can in fact undergo
modal subordination, as does the original data from Roberts (1989). The infelicity of (4-b)
can be explained as due to something else: the restriction on will that it quantify over
reasonably likely worlds, as opposed to would which is happy with unlikely possibilities
(Iatridou, 2000). If we create a more realistic situation, will is felicitous.
(5) Stop dancing. Someonei might come in here. Theyi’ll think you’re crazy!
We can then conclude that will and gonna are modals, and take their implicit conditional
readings to be due to contextual domain restriction.
Proposal I argue then that will and gonna both have a free variable for their modal
base, which is contextually valued. However, in the case of will there is a presupposition
that its modal-base-variable already be in the assignment function, i.e., it presupposes a
familiar modal base, as the simplified denotations below show.
(6) a. [[gonna]]c(φ) = λw.[1 iff ∀v ∈ m . φ(v)] iff m ⊂ Met(w)
b. [[will]]c(φ) = λw.[1 iff ∀v ∈ m . φ(v)] iff m ⊂ Met(w) & m ∈ Dom(c)
All utterances are interpreted with respect to c, a context. If a variable is in the context, it
is familiar, as in Heim (1982). Met(w) is the set of worlds metaphysically accessible to w,
i.e., the modal base standardly assumed in the literature treating futures as modals; each
modal is therefore presupposed to take a metaphysical modal base. If these expressions
allow any other possible modal bases (e.g., epistemic), the denotation must be altered to
allow for that. These denotations abstract away from ordering sources.
This analysis predicts that in modal contexts, or contexts where a set of worlds has
been made salient, will will necessarily take an implicit conditional meaning, being re-
stricted to that set of worlds. In the same context, gonna will be able to have the same
implicit conditional meaning, or simply take the (non-salient) full set of metaphysical
alternatives, giving the simple prediction reading.
Essentially this account says will and modals like it have an anaphoric modal base
while gonna and modals like it do not. This makes another prediction: will-type modals
should be infelicitous discourse initially, while gonna-type modals should not be. The
prediction is borne out:
(7) Someone walks into a room and says:
a. #I’ll fail my exams tomorrow.
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b. I’m gonna fail my exams tomorrow.
Since there is no salient set of worlds in the discourse, will gives rise to a presupposition
failure. But gonna bears no such presupposition, so it is acceptable. The same split holds
for other modals:
(8) Someone walks into a room and says:
a. #I {would, could} fail my exams tomorrow.
b. I {might, may} fail my exams tomorrow.
A few things may need to be said about will – first of all, it sometimes appears with-
out an implicit conditional reading; this isn’t necessarily problematic since will should
be licensed if the whole set of metaphysically accessible worlds is salient. Second, it
sometimes appears in literary or high registers in discourse initial contexts.
(9) Obama will send 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan.
I exclude these cases from the analysis, since the facts are simply different in these
registers; there is no gonna, so will subsumes the functions of gonna in those registers.
Notice that (9) is bad in conversational spoken English. Therefore this is only an analysis
of casual, colloquial, spoken American English. Finally, will can be used to make offers
or commitments, as first discussed in Copley (2002). These offers can come discourse
initially.
(10) Someone walks into a room where people are setting up for a party and says:
a. I’ll put out the chips. (Offer)
b. I’m gonna put out the chips. (#Offer)
I assume that this offer use of will is a separate lexical item, owing to the fact that offers
are not always made with futures, as shown in (10-b) and (11) from Spanish.
(11) a. Ya lo hago yo. (Offer)
“I’ll do it.” (Lit.: “I do it.”)
b. Ya lo hare´ yo. (#Offer)
“I’m gonna do it.”
(11-a) shows that the simple present in Spanish is used for offers, while (11-b), the
morphological future, is not. I therefore argue that offer-will is a separate lexical item
which does not enter into the analysis. While the data on will may seem somewhat
muddled due to these various caveats, the data in (1) and (7) is robust, as is data for
other modals like would. While more perhaps needs to be said about will, the basic
empirical claim is this: some modals undergo modal subordination obligatorily, some
optionally.
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Previous Accounts Other accounts have been made for the will/gonna split. Copley
(2002) proposes that while both are necessity modals along the lines of what is proposed
here, gonna is scoped over by a high imperfective operator which prevents its use in
offers, as in (10-b). Copley claims that the high aspectual operator makes (10-b) mean
something like “I was already planning to put out the chips”. However, while (10-b) is
consistent with the utterer’s having already planned to do so, it is not required; (10-b)
may be uttered by someone who has spontaneously decided to put out chips. Moreover,
this analysis fails to capture the facts in (1) or (7); if anything, Copley predicts that in
(7) will should be better than gonna, since there is no prior contextually salient temporal
interval for the high aspectual operator to refer to.
Haegeman (1989) provides a non-formal reference time analysis, summarized below.
simple past E,R < S will S > E,R
pres. perfect E < S,R gonna S,R > E
Essentially will is analogized to the simple past while gonna is analogized to the
present perfect; besides being a future-as-tense analysis, this again makes wrong predic-
tions:
(12) a. John has walked into the bar. # Then he has taken off his coat.
b. John is gonna walk into the bar. Then he’s gonna take off his coat.
(13) Someone walks into a room and says:
a. I failed my exam.
b. #I’ll fail my exam.
As seen above, gonna does not behave like the present perfect, nor does will behave like
the simple past. The analysis I propose therefore improves upon our understanding of
the will/gonna distinction, while also illuminating more generally two classes of modals
in English, based upon their modal subordination behavior.
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